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Secure communication protocols are often formulated in a paradigm where the message is en-
coded in measurement outcomes. In this work we propose a rather unexplored framework in which
the message is encoded in measurement settings rather than in their outcomes. In particular, we
study two different variants of such secure communication protocols in which the message alphabet
corresponds to measurement settings of mutually unbiased bases.
INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic protocols are designed to exchange se-
cret messages between two parties, usually referred to as
Alice and Bob. Bennett and Brassard [1] first demon-
strated that the fundamental laws of quantum mechan-
ics can play a central role in the security of a properly
formulated protocol. Their seminal work has pushed for-
ward the field of quantum information theory and trig-
gered a vast study of quantum cryptography. Numerous
variations and generalizations of their scheme have been
suggested, e.g., [2–5].
In a recent work, Kalev, Mann and Revzen [6] showed
how the disturbance induced by a nonselective measure-
ment can be used to establish a communication channel.
They presented a protocol in which two parties can es-
tablish a communication channel using the choice of mea-
surement settings (rather than their outcomes) as signal.
It was understood that the proposed protocol is not se-
cure [6, 7] and left as an open question whether the pro-
tocol can be used for secret sharing. In this work, we
address that question and demonstrate two extensions of
this protocol that proved to be secure. These extensions
deviate from the common framework of existing quan-
tum cryptographic protocols based on the original Ben-
nett and Brassard protocol where the secret information
is encoded in states of a quantum system through a mea-
surement outcome. To our knowledge, this work presents
the first quantum cryptography proposal in which the
secret information is encoded in measurement settings
instead of measurement outcomes.
From the onset, we admit that our proposal is experi-
mentally challenging to implement and seems to offer no
advantage over the original Bennett and Brassard proto-
col. We believe that the Bennett and Brassard protocol
is superior to this and most later discrete variable proto-
cols due to its simplicity. The aim of this modest work
is not to overthrow existing quantum cryptographic pro-
tocols and their rich history. Instead, we merely wish to
explore new possibilities for secure quantum communica-
tion, which may in turn lead to new insights on quantum
cryptography.
COMMUNICATION BY CHOICE OF
MEASUREMENT
Before presenting the secure variants, we recall the
original communication protocol that uses the choice of
measurement basis as a signal [6]. Alice and Bob first
define a set of d + 1 mutually unbiased bases (MUBs)
[8–10] in a prime dimension d. The first basis, denoted
by b = 0¨, is the computational basis {|n〉}d−1n=0. The re-
maining d bases, parametrized by b = 0, 1, . . . , d− 1, are
given in terms of the computational basis by [9]
|m; b〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
n=0
|n〉ωbn2−2nm , (1)
for m, b = 0, 1, . . . , d− 1 where
ω = i for d = 2 and (2)
ω = e
2pii
d for d > 2 . (3)
No further classical communication takes place.
Next Alice prepares one of the d3 two-qudit maximally
entangled state [11, 12]:
|c, r; s〉1,2 = 1√
d
d−1∑
n=0
|n〉1|c− n〉2ωsn
2
−2rn , (4)
with c, r, s = 0, 1, . . . , d − 1. Throughout this letter, the
arithmetics is modulo d. For each s, these states form an
orthonormal basis for the Hilbert space of the two qudits.
Alice keeps qudit 1 and sends qudit 2 to Bob. After this,
Bob chooses b, the signal that he wishes to communicate,
and measures qudit 2 in the MUB {|m; b〉d−1m=0}. The
outcome of the measurement is irrelevant and therefore
Bob may choose to disregard it. Finally, Bob returns the
measured qudit 2 to Alice who then measures both qudits
1 and 2 in the basis of preparation {|c′, r′; s〉1,2}d−1c′,r′=0.
From the outcome c′, r′, Alice can infer the value of b
2Bob’s choice Alice’s outcomes |c′, r′〉
b basis |0, 0〉 |0, 1〉 |1, 0〉 |1, 1〉
0¨ Z 1
2
0 1
2
0
0 X 1
2
0 0 1
2
1 Y 1
2
1
2
0 0
TABLE I: Communication by choice of measurement basis
protocol for d = 2 when Alice prepares the two qubit state
with c = r = s = 0. This state corresponds to one of the
four bell states. The three mutually unbiased bases Bob can
choose to measure in correspond to theX, Y and Z axes of the
Bloch sphere. When Alice performs her measurement in the
Bell basis, an outcome |0, 0〉 gives her an inconclusive result.
The other three outcomes inform her of Bob’s measurement
choice b.
from the following table:
c′ 6= c → b = s− r−r′c−c′ ,
r′ 6= r, c′ = c → b = 0¨ ,
r′ = r, c′ = c → inconclusive .
(5)
The probability of an inconclusive outcome is 1d . As an
example, the case for d = 2 is summarized in probability
table I.
This protocol is vulnerable to an intercept and resend
attack by an eavesdropper Eve [7]. Eve intercepts qudit
2 that Alice sends. She then prepares her own maximally
entangled two-qudit state |ce, re; se〉3,4 from the set de-
fined in (4) and sends qudit 4 to Bob. Next she intercepts
the returning qudit from Bob and measures qudits 3 and
4 in the basis {|c′e, r′e; se〉3,4}d−1c′
e
,r′
e
=0
. From her measure-
ment outcome, she can infer b except for probability 1d
when it is inconclusive. If her measurement yields an
inconclusive outcome, Eve forwards qudit 2 to Alice un-
measured. Otherwise Eve measures qudit 2 in the MUB
labeled by b and forward the measured qudit to Alice.
Performing this attack, Eve learns the decoded signal b
and remains undetected.
SECURE COMMUNICATION
In what follows we propose two secure communication
protocols where the message is encoded in the choice of
the MUB measured by Bob. We prove the security of
these communication protocols for various eavesdropping
attacks. In these protocols, as well as in the original
protocol, the actual numerical value of c, r, s in the ini-
tially prepared state is irrelevant and we arbitrarily set
c = r = s = 0.
First protocol
For our first proposal, the communication can be made
secure if Alice and Bob check that the qudits they share
are indeed maximally entangled. To this end, Bob ran-
domly choose a subset of his qudits to be used as ‘pre-
test’ qudits. He then choose a random index b and
measures each pre-test qudit in the MUB {|m; b〉}d−1m=0
and records the outcome m. He communicates the ba-
sis choice b and outcome m to Alice who then choose
to measure her qudit in the MUB {|m′; a〉}d−1m′=0 with a
random index a. Since the MUBs are informationally
complete [8], Alice and Bob can determine whether or
not that their qudits were indeed in the state |0, 0; 0〉1,2
from the joint probability distributions of their measure-
ment results. The non pre-test qudits are measured and
decoded as in the original protocol and only the non-
ambiguous outcomes from these qudits carry the commu-
nication signals. After Alice’s measurements, Alice and
Bob perform a ‘post-test’ step. Alice randomly selects
a fraction of her decoded result to check for maximum
correlation with Bob’s encoded signal. If Alice and Bob
affirm from their pre-test results that their shared state
are maximally entangled and from their post-test results
that their correlations are maximum, we claim that they
can be sure that their communication is secret.
In the following, we show that if Alice and Bob have
the two-qudits maximally entangled state |0, 0; 0〉1,2, then
Eve cannot gain any information about the signal b.
When Bob receives qudit 2, Alice and Bob have a pure
maximally entangled state. This implies that Eve can-
not share any quantum or classical correlation with Alice
and Bob at this stage. After Bob measures qudit 2 and
returns it to Alice, to Eve who is ignorant of the Bob’s
measurement outcome, qudit 2 is always in a completely
mixed state regardless of the signal b. Hence this shows
Eve cannot gain any information about b. However, Eve
can still interact with qudit 2 to influence the outcome of
Alice’s measurement. But when Alice and Bob perform
the post-test check on their decoded signals, any miscor-
relations would alert them of Eve’s interference. This
proves our claim and concludes the first proposal.
We should add that this protocol is a tomographic pro-
tocol [4, 5]. Alice and Bob need to characterize the state
they share before they can trust their channel. Obvi-
ously, any practical reconstruction scheme has unavoid-
able noise sources and the level of noise will have to be
taken into account in a complete security proof. Such
analysis, though is important for practical purposes, is
out of the scope and aim of this paper.
Second protocol
Our second proposal for secure communication is for
Alice and Bob to utilize two different computational
bases to define two families of MUBs. The choice of the
second computational basis is immaterial as long as it is
different from the original computational basis {|n〉}d−1n=0
and is not mutually unbiased to it. For example one can
3choose
|̂m〉 =
d−1∑
n=0
|n〉hm,n ,m = 0, 1, . . . , d− 1 , (6)
where the unitary matrix h is the square root of the
(complex) Hadamard matrix H with matrix elements
Hm,n = e
2piimn/d/
√
d. We define the hat MUBs as
|̂m; b〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
n=0
|̂n〉ωbn2−2nm , (7)
for m, b = 0, 1, . . . , d− 1, analogous to Eq. (1).
In this proposal, Alice randomly creates either the
state |0, 0; 0〉1,2 or
̂|0, 0; 0〉
1,2 =
1√
d
d−1∑
n=0
|̂n〉
1
|̂ − n〉
2
. (8)
Alice keeps qudit 1 and sends qudit 2 to Bob. Bob ran-
domly chooses to measure in one of the hat MUBs or
in one of the original MUBs. His MUB choice, labeled
by b, represents the signal to be sent. Bob returns the
measured qudit to Alice. Alice then measures qudits 1
and 2 in her preparation basis, either {|c, r; 0〉1,2}d−1c,r=0 or
{ ̂|c, r; 0〉
1,2}d−1c,r=0 where
̂|c, r; 0〉
1,2 =
1√
d
d−1∑
n=0
|̂n〉
1
̂|c− n〉
2
ω−2rn , (9)
with c, r = 0, 1, . . . , d − 1. After this stage, Bob an-
nounces his computational basis choice. For the cases
where Alice and Bob used the same computational ba-
sis, Alice decodes the signal using table (5). The cases
for which Alice and Bob’s computational basis choices
do not match or where the outcomes are inconclusive are
discarded. They expect full correlations in the decoded
signals. Alice and Bob select a random subset of the de-
coded signals to check that their correlations are indeed
full.
We shall show that Eve cannot do an intercept and
resend attack that renders the original protocol insecure.
In the intercept and resend attack scenario we consider,
Eve intercepts qudit 2 and creates one of two possible
maximally entangled state: either |ψ〉3,4 = |0, 0; 0〉3,4 or
the hat version |̂ψ〉
3,4 =
̂|0, 0; 0〉
3,4. For our discussion, it
is immaterial which of the state Eve actually prepares.
Say that she prepares |ψ〉3,4. Eve keeps qudit 3 and for-
wards qudit 4 to Bob.
Bob performs his signal encoding by measuring qudit
4 in one of 2(d + 1) MUBs. (There are d + 1 MUBs de-
fined in terms of the original computational basis and an
additional d+1 MUBs in terms of the hat computational
basis.) Thereafter Bob sends qudit 4 to Alice.
Eve intercepts qudit 4 on its way back. Suppose Bob
measured in the {|m; b〉}d−1m=0 basis, the state Eve holds is
then
ρ3,4 =
d−1∑
m=0
|m; b〉〈m; b|ψ〉〈ψ|m; b〉〈m; b| . (10)
This state comprises of an equal mixture of d orthogonal
pure states. Indeed ρ3,4 can be written as
ρ3,4 =
1
d
{∑d−1
r=0 |0, r; 0〉〈0, r; 0| for b = 0¨∑d−1
c=0 |c,−bc; 0〉〈c,−bc; 0| for b = 0, 1, . . . , d− 1
,
(11)
which is diagonal in the maximally entangled basis
{|c, r; 0〉3,4}d−1c,r=0.
Eve’s eavesdropping strategy is now to measure qu-
dits 3 and 4 in her preparation basis {|c, r; 0〉3,4}d−1c,r=0.
(Had she prepared the state |̂ψ〉
3,4 instead, the strat-
egy for her would then be to measure qudits 3 and 4 in
the { ̂|c, r; 0〉
3,4}d−1c,r=0 basis.) Eve obtains full information
about the decoded signal and remains undetected using
the following strategy. If she gets the outcome c = r = 0,
her measurement is inconclusive and Eve returns qudit
2 to Alice unmeasured. Otherwise, Eve correctly infers
Bob’s encoding b as b = 0¨ if c = 0 and b = −r/c if c 6= 0.
Eve now measures qudit 2 in the MUB labeled by b in
her chosen computational basis choice and forwards the
measured qudit to Alice.
However, if Bob had measured in the hat basis
{|̂m; b〉}d−1m=0 instead, the state Eve holds is now
ρˆ3,4 =
d−1∑
m=0
|̂m; b〉〈̂m; b|ψ〉〈ψ|̂m; b〉〈̂m; b| , (12)
which unlike ρ3,4 is not diagonal in the {|c, r; 0〉}d−1c,r=0
maximally entangled basis. In this case when Eve
measures the joint state ρˆ3,4 in her preparation basis
{|c, r; 0〉}d−1c,r=0 and subsequently measures qubit 2 based
on the outcome of that measurement, she would end up
measuring qudit 2 in a different basis from Bob’s. If
after that, Alice measures in the same basis family as
Bob’s, due to Eve’s forwarding a differently measured
state, Alice will have a probability to obtain an outcome
that was otherwise impossible without Eve’s interference.
This will reveal Eve’s presence when Alice and Bob check
their correlations.
We note that the security analysis here follows closely
the reasoning of the security analysis of the original quan-
tum cryptographic protocol by Bennett and Brassard [1].
We concede that there may be other forms of more so-
phisticated attacks that Eve can perform without being
detected. As the purpose of this work is to introduce this
protocol and not to exhaust all possible attacks that Eve
can perform, we leave that possibility and the discussion
of a noisy channel for future work.
4CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have discussed a new possibility
for secure encoding of information in quantum systems.
Rather than encoding information in quantum states, we
introduce two secure communication protocols where the
information is encoded in measurement settings—in par-
ticular of complementary, incompatible measurements.
In the first proposal, we show that any information leak-
age to Eve can be detected by Alice and Bob. In the
second proposal, we show that Eve cannot do an inter-
cept and resend attack and remain undetected.
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